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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the FTC and the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice together serve to keep domestic markets free and competitive for the benefit of American consumers.1 One such way these antitrust regulators maintain and
enforce free competition is by blocking potential mergers between competing firms that would result in higher prices or
lower quality products without creating offsetting positive efficiencies.2 Thus, merger review by antitrust enforcers inherently involves weighing the procompetitive benefits of mergers
against the anticompetitive consequences. Since 1968, the antitrust regulators have evaluated the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of mergers under the framework of the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.3 Mergers between firms that operate in separate and distinct geographic areas, known as
“cross-market mergers,” present a unique challenge to antitrust regulators in performing this balancing test, as the anticompetitive effects of such mergers are unclear.4
Since President Obama signed the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA) into law in 2010, there has been a
surge in the number of mergers between healthcare providers,
as firms in the healthcare industry strive to achieve the Act’s
goal of “population health management.”5 Increasingly,
1
See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS OF
MARKET POWER 1–2 (2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
page/files/20160414_cea_competition_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X9V2Y7P].
2
See FTC, STRATEGIC PLAN FISCAL YEARS 2003-2008 3 (2003), https://www.ftc
.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports_annual/strategic-plan/spfy03fy08
.pdf [https://perma.cc/GRX5-M5Z2].
3
See W. Stephen Smith & Jeff Jaeckel, Good News, Bad News, or No News?
The U.S. Antitrust Enforcement Agencies’ Commentary on the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 10 M&A LAW., 10, 11 (2006).
4
See Gregory S. Vistnes & Yianis Sarafidis, Cross-Market Hospital Mergers:
A Holistic Approach, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 253, 254–59 (2013).
5
Kenneth L. Davis, Hospital Mergers Can Lower Costs and Improve Medical
Care, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 15, 2014, 7:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
kenneth-l-davis-hospital-mergers-can-lower-costs-and-improve-medical-care1410823048 [https://perma.cc/3XAJ-BSXA] (describing the benefits of population health management); Anna Wilde Mathews, Health-Care Providers, Insurers
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healthcare mergers are occurring between providers that draw
patients from separate and distinct geographic markets. 6 Antitrust regulators, following the most recent Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, have been hesitant to challenge these cross-market
mergers because they do not increase the concentration of any
particular geographic market, suggesting that cross-market
mergers do not have a noticeable effect on competition.7 Nonetheless, recent studies indicate that cross-market mergers
among healthcare providers raise prices for insurance payors,
and ultimately patients, without producing any improvement
in quality of care.8
This Note argues that the higher prices following crossmarket provider mergers are anticompetitive effects caused by
the merged firm’s increased bargaining power and by the crossmarket subsidization of price increases. In response to this
finding, antitrust regulators should take a new approach to
reviewing proposed cross-market mergers that focuses on identifying signals of a potential price increase.9 Ultimately, both
regulators and courts must adapt merger review to address the
unique issues surrounding cross-market mergers. Part I provides an overview of how regulators and courts currently review
healthcare provider mergers under the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines. Part II provides an overview of the current climate
in the market for healthcare services by introducing the players
in the market—providers, payors, employers, and patients—
and examining how they negotiate to arrive at the price for
healthcare services. Part II also offers an explanation as to why
healthcare providers are so keen to merge following the ACA
Supersize, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2015, 11:46 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
health-care-providers-insurers-supersize-1442850400 [https://perma.cc/
4MD6-PRBD] (noting an increase in healthcare mergers following the passage of
the ACA).
6
Between 1998 and 2012, more than a third of all healthcare provider
mergers occurred between firms operating in different geographic markets. See
Leemore Dafny, Examining Healthcare Competition: Trends in Provider Consolidation 89–90 (Feb. 25, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/618591/transcript-day2.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/67BZ-KR8F]).
7
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 15 (2010)
[hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES] (explaining the importance of market
concentration in horizontal merger analysis; market shares and market concentration “can directly influence firms’ competitive incentives”).
8
See Dafny, supra note 6, at 91.
9
Some commentators note that the FTC is already making greater efforts to
scrutinize mergers of hospitals in adjoining markets. See Lisa Schencker, FTC
Takes Close Look at Advocate, NorthShore Merger, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Apr. 1,
2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150401/NEWS/1504099
88 [https://perma.cc/T48R-RLBS].
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and how such mergers may be beneficial to society. Part III
then examines both the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of cross-market mergers between healthcare providers.
Finally, Part IV proposes a new approach for regulators and
courts to evaluate cross-market mergers aimed at predicting
these potential competitive effects.
I
MODERN FRAMEWORK FOR MERGER REVIEW
A. Evaluation of Healthcare Provider Mergers by Antitrust
Regulators
The ultimate goal of antitrust regulators in reviewing a horizontal merger is to determine whether the merged firm could
exploit an increase in market power following the merger to
raise prices.10 To answer this question, the regulators first
must define the market in which the merging parties operate.
Once the regulators have defined the market, they must evaluate how competitive the market is currently and how competitive it will be following the merger.11 In performing this
analysis, antitrust regulators use “market concentration” as an
indicator of competitiveness, with a higher concentration indicating less competition in the market.12 If the concentration
analysis indicates that the merger is anticompetitive to such an
extent that it will harm consumers, regulators may seek to
block the consummation of the merger in court.13 Additionally,
in cases involving mergers that have already been consummated, the regulators may use actual price effects to demonstrate that the merger is anticompetitive and may seek a
retroactive remedy such as disgorgement.14
1. Market Definition
In order to determine if a horizontal merger will be anticompetitive, antitrust regulators must identify both the line of
commerce and the section of the country the merger will impact.15 Market definition is based solely on the concept of “de10
See Keith N. Hylton, Brown Shoe Versus the Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
39 REV. INDUS. ORG. 95, 97 (2011).
11
See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 7–18.
12
See id. at 18.
13
See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2012).
14
See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 3. The remedy of
disgorgement requires the merged entity to return profits gained through an
anticompetitive merger. See Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy,
76 ANTITRUST L.J. 79, 79–80 (2009).
15
See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 7.
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mand substitution”: a consumer’s “ability and willingness to
substitute away from one product to another in response to a
price increase” or a decrease in quality.16 Regulators define the
relevant line of commerce and section of the country using the
“hypothetical monopolist test.”17 Under this test, a market is
defined where a hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a small but significant and nontransitory increase in price
(SSNIP) for a given product in a delineated geographic area.18
Thus, in a market defined by the hypothetical monopolist test,
consumers are unwilling to substitute for different products or
purchase their products in a different geographic area in response to an increase in price by the hypothetical
monopolist.19
The line of commerce, known as the product market, includes all substitutes a consumer would be willing to accept for
a given good in response to an increase in price.20 In practice,
the product markets for healthcare mergers are divided based
on the specific nature of services provided. For example, competition for the provision of essential health services occurs in
the product market for “primary” or “secondary” healthcare,
while competition for the provision of more specialized care
occurs in the market for “tertiary” healthcare.21 However, for
the purposes of this Note, the relevant product market may be
generalized as the market for “healthcare services.”
The relevant section of the country in which competition
occurs, known as the geographic market, is defined as the area
beyond which consumers would be unwilling to travel to receive a substitute good in response to a SSNIP.22 For healthcare provider mergers, the geographic market is the “patient
discharge” area: the area from which the providers attract patients.23 In choosing healthcare providers, patients are limited
16

Id.
Id. at 8–9.
18
See Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, A Practical Guide to the Hypothetical Monopolist Test for Market Definition, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1031,
1035 (2008).
19
See id.
20
See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 7.
21
See Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 891 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“Primary and secondary . . . hospital services are common medical services like
setting a broken bone and performing a tonsillectomy . . . [while] ‘tertiary care’ . . .
includes more complex services like invasive cardiovascular surgery and intensive
neonatal care.”).
22
See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 13.
23
See Michael A. Morrisey et al., Defining Geographic Markets for Hospital
Care, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 171, 176 (1988) (noting that the geographic
market for a hospital may be defined as the area from which the hospital receives
17
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geographically by travel costs and administrative barriers such
as the extent of coverage offered by the patient’s health insurance plan.24 Travel costs include both the actual price of
transportation as well as the value of the time the patient
spends travelling to a distant provider.
2. Market Concentration
Once the product and geographic markets have been defined, antitrust regulators must evaluate the level of competition both in the market’s current state and in the market
following the proposed merger.25 The regulators’ first step in
this evaluation is identifying all other firms that earn revenues
in the defined product and geographic markets.26 Such firms
are classified as “market participants.”27 For mergers between
healthcare providers, market participants include all other
healthcare providers within the relevant market. Next, regulators calculate the market shares for all market participants.28
Typically, the calculation of market share is based on historical
evidence of revenues, but the regulators may also consider any
indicator of the firms’ future competitive significance in the
relevant market.29 For healthcare providers, the number of
hospital beds each firm maintains in proportion to the total
number of beds available within the relevant market serves as
a reasonable proxy for the firm’s market share.30 Regulators
use this market share information to calculate market concentration.31 Based on its concentration, a market falls into one of
three categories: highly concentrated markets, which have the
greatest potential to realize anticompetitive effects; moderately
concentrated markets; and unconcentrated markets, which
have the lowest risk of producing anticompetitive effects.32
Both regulators and courts presume that a merger causing a
large increase in concentration and resulting in a highly convirtually all of its admissions; “virtually all” for these purposes is defined as either
75% or 90%).
24
See id. at 170.
25
See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 18.
26
See id. at 15.
27
Id.
28
See id. at 16.
29
See id. at 16–17.
30
See Morrisey et al., supra note 23, at 179.
31
Typically, market concentration is measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is calculated by summing the square of each market
participant’s market share. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at
18–19. Antitrust regulators identify a market with an HHI greater than 2,500 as
highly concentrated. See id.
32
See id. at 19.
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centrated market is anticompetitive.33 However, this presumption is rebuttable if the merging parties produce evidence
showing that entry into the market by new competitors is easy,
and thus the merger is unlikely to actually increase market
power.34
B. Evaluation of Healthcare Provider Mergers by the
Courts
If the antitrust regulator determines that there is a strong
possibility a healthcare provider merger will have anticompetitive effects, the regulator will pursue a preliminary injunction
in federal court to block the merger before it is consummated.35
In deciding whether to grant this preliminary injunction, the
court must evaluate the likelihood the regulator will succeed on
the merits of an antitrust claim brought under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act.36 The court will grant a preliminary injunction
where, after considering the regulator’s likelihood of success on
the merits and weighing the equitable impact of its decision,
granting an injunction would be in the public’s interest.37
Courts typically place great weight upon the market concentration analysis presented by the antitrust regulator.38 In
Philadelphia National Bank, the Supreme Court established a
presumption of anticompetitive effects from a merger that
causes a large increase in concentration and results in a highly
concentrated market, holding that:
[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market is
33
Regulators presume that mergers involving an increase in HHI of greater
than 200 and resulting in highly concentrated markets are presumed to enhance
the market power of the merged firm to an anticompetitive level. See id.
34
See id. at 27–29.
35
The Federal Trade Commission, the regulator that evaluates healthcare
mergers, derives its power to seek an injunction in federal court to block an
anticompetitive merger from Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
David M. Stryker, Note, The Federal Trade Commission, Injunctive Relief, and
Allegedly Anticompetitive Mergers: Preliminary Relief Under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 58 IND. L.J. 293, 293 (1982).
36
Section 7 of the Clayton Act holds unlawful any acquisition or merger
where “the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly.” 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
37
See Stryker, supra note 35, at 298.
38
See Deborah A. Garza, Market Definition, the New Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and the Long March Away from Structural Presumptions, ANTITRUST SOURCE,
Oct. 2010, at 1, 4 (noting that since the Horizontal Merger Guidelines evaluate
mergers in terms of market concentration, “courts have generally assessed mergers that way”).
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so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it
must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing
that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive
effects.39

In recent healthcare merger evaluations, courts have debated how much weight they should place on the merging parties’ asserted nonprice and price efficiencies associated with
the deal. The parties to a merger that results in an anticompetitive level of market concentration under the Philadelphia National Bank presumption may claim nonprice efficiencies by
arguing that although prices could increase following the
merger, this increase in price will be more than offset by a
corresponding increase in quality. Alternatively, the parties
may claim that the merger will produce price efficiencies that
allow the merged firm to lower prices and increase competition
with other market participants. Improvements in care and
price efficiencies that may result from healthcare mergers are
discussed in greater detail later in this Note.40
Prior to 1982, courts generally ignored the efficiencies defense altogether and essentially held the Philadelphia National
Bank presumption to be conclusive proof of anticompetitive
effects.41 This approach closely tracks the 1968 iteration of the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines and is considered outdated
under more recent iterations of the Guidelines, and therefore it
is seldom used by modern courts.42 Following the publication
of the 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, courts have shown a
willingness to consider efficiencies as evidence to rebut the
regulator’s claim that a merger is presumed to be anticompetitive.43 Modern courts generally consider efficiencies to some
degree in deciding whether a merger should be presumed anticompetitive.44 However, the weight given to the efficiencies
39

Phila. Nat’l Bank v. United States, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
See infra subpart III.B.
41
See William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the
Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST
L.J. 207, 213–17 (2003).
42
See id. at 213 (“Unless there are exceptional circumstances, the Department will not accept as a justification for an acquisition . . . the claim that the
merger will produce [efficiencies]” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1968 MERGER
GUIDELINES 8 (1968))).
43
See id. at 232 (noting that since the 1982 version of the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, four circuit courts have had the occasion to consider an efficiencies
defense to a merger and all four have shown a willingness to allow the efficiencies
defense to rebut a presumption of anticompetitiveness).
44
See id. at 232.
40
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defense and how such a defense factors into the Clayton Act
Section 7 analysis varies from court to court.45
Courts tend to differ in the burden of proof the merging
parties must meet in order to rebut the Philadelphia National
Bank presumption.46 The Eleventh Circuit was the first to reject the 1968 Guidelines approach to efficiencies, holding in
University Health that efficiencies may be used to rebut a prima
facie showing of anticompetitive effects.47 Following the Eleventh Circuit’s lead, the Eighth Circuit in Tenet Health found
that the combination of two hospitals could produce a “larger
and more efficient” facility able to “provide better medical care
than either of those hospitals could separately.”48 In the widely
followed decision Long Island Jewish Medical Center, the district court placed significant limits on the efficiencies defense,
holding that the efficiencies claimed must be significant and
the merger must “enhance[ ] rather than hinder[ ] competition
because of the increased efficiencies.”49
In the most recent decisions involving the efficiencies defense, courts have greatly increased the burden the merging
parties must meet in order to rebut the Philadelphia National
Bank presumption. In evaluating a merger between two manufacturers of baby formula, the D.C. Circuit in Heinz held that to
rebut a presumption of anticompetitive effects based on high
market concentration levels, the merging parties must supply
“proof of extraordinary efficiencies” that are specific to the
merger.50 Building on Heinz, the Eleventh Circuit in St. Luke’s
essentially rejected all nonprice efficiencies in healthcare provider mergers, holding that although a merger would “improve
the delivery of health care,” such an efficiency gain is not sufficient to rebut the Philadelphia National Bank presumption unless the merging parties show “that the merger would increase
45
See Peter J. Hammer, Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions: Price
and Non-Price Competition in Hospital Markets, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 727, 744
n.40 (1999).
46
The 1982 Guidelines articulated the basic requirements an efficiencies
defense must meet in order to warrant consideration by regulators and courts. To
meet these requirements, the efficiencies defense must contain clear and convincing evidence of substantial cost savings already enjoyed by other firms in the
industry that could not be realized by less anticompetitive means than the present merger. See Kolasky & Dick, supra note 41, at 218 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES § 3.5 (1982)).
47
FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222 (11th Cir. 1991).
48
FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999).
49
United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 137
(E.D.N.Y. 1997).
50
FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720–21 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, 1997 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 30–32 (1997)).
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competition or decrease prices.”51 Finally, in the most recent
decision involving an efficiencies defense, the Third Circuit in
Penn State Hershey Medical Center set forth four requirements
for efficiencies: (1) the efficiencies must “offset the anticompetitive concerns in highly concentrated markets”; (2) the efficiencies “must be merger specific”; (3) the efficiencies “must be
verifiable, not speculative”; and (4) the efficiencies “must not
arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or service.”52
Overall, under the current state of the law, the merging parties
must offer a highly compelling efficiencies defense to overcome
the Philadelphia presumption.
II
OVERVIEW OF THE MARKET FOR HEALTHCARE SERVICES
A. Structure of the Market for Healthcare Services
In order to understand the effects of cross-market healthcare provider mergers on prices, it is important to first understand the main players—healthcare providers, health
insurance payors, employers, and employees/patients—and
how they interact. This Part examines the negotiations process
between providers, payors, employers, and patients.
First, providers and health insurance payors negotiate over
the price at which a plan will accept a hospital into its network.53 A payor, for purposes of this Note, is a private health
insurance provider that reimburses the medical expenses of
patients enrolled in its health insurance plan.54 A payor seeks
to maximize the coverage of its plan at the lowest possible price
in order to make its plan as attractive as possible to employers
and patients.55 The more patients a provider currently serves,
the more attractive the provider is to a payor, since the payor
51
Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778
F.3d 775, 791 (11th Cir. 2014).
52
FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., No. 16–2365 2016 WL 5389289, at
*13–15 (3d Cir. July 26, 2016) (rejecting the merging parties’ efficiencies defense
that the merger would relieve “capacity constraints” and “engage in risk-based
contracting” because these efficiencies were “insufficient to rebut the presumption of anticompetitiveness” established by the FTC’s market concentration
analysis).
53
See David A. Argue & Richard T. Shin, An Innovative Approach to an Old
Problem: Hospital Merger Simulation, 24 ANTITRUST 49, 49 (2009).
54
See Gary T. Schwartz, National Health Care Program: What Its Effect Would
Be on American Tort Law and Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1339, 1346
(1994) (noting Medicare as an example of a nonprivate health insurance payor).
55
See OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN. MARTHA COAKLEY, EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST
TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS 28 (2010) (arguing that payors “must maintain stable,
broad provider networks”).
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maximizes its profits by enrolling as many employers and patients in its plan as possible and a high usage rate indicates
that the provider is popular with employers and patients.56 A
provider, on the other hand, seeks to maximize its revenue by
maximizing the number of patients directed to it by the
payor.57 Thus, the more patients enrolled in a payor’s plan, the
more attractive the plan is to a provider.58 In recent years,
bargaining power has shifted in favor of providers due in large
part to antitrust regulators’ inability to successfully challenge
provider mergers.59
Next, payors and employers negotiate over the price at
which an employer may enroll its employees in the payor’s
health plan.60 An employer seeks to maximize both the quality
and convenience of healthcare services for its employees at the
lowest possible price.61 Large employers that have workers living throughout a broad geographic region will demand a health
plan that offers coverage over the entire area.62 Large employers, therefore, play an important role in cross-market mergers
where workers living in separate geographic healthcare services markets are employed by the same firm.
Finally, patients either select a healthcare provider from
the health plan provided to them by their employers or negotiate for a health plan directly with a payor.63 For the purposes
of this Note, it is assumed that all patients receive a health
insurance plan from their employer. Since the cost of healthcare is covered by insurance, an employee is not concerned
56
See id. (providing “the total number of [patients] who are associated
with . . . the provider system” as a proxy for the provider’s leverage over a payor).
57
See Kelly J. Devers et al., Hospitals’ Negotiating Leverage with Health
Plans: How and Why Has It Changed?, 38 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 419, 422 (2003)
(examining how “[t]he threat of a plan excluding a hospital from a contract, and
channeling large blocks of patients elsewhere” impacts negotiations between
payors and providers).
58
See id.
59
Thomas R. McCarthy & Scott J. Thomas, Antitrust Issues Between Payers
and Providers, ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON., Mar. 2002, at 2–3.
60
See Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 4, at 266–67.
61
See id. at 267 (“All else equal, a health plan with a more comprehensive
provider network will be more attractive to both employers and employees.”).
62
See Argue & Shin, supra note 53, at 53 (“[A] broader set of hospital choices
increases . . . the likelihood of a payor winning an employer’s contract.”).
63
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, over half of all workers receive
health insurance from their employer. HUBERT JANICKI, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE: 2010, at 1–2 (2013), https://www.census
.gov/prod/2013pubs/p70-134.pdf [https://perma.cc/LFL6-M52U] (noting that
the percentage of workers receiving employment-based health insurance is
decreasing).
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with price when selecting a healthcare provider.64 Rather,
when selecting which provider to use, the employee is concerned with nonprice factors such as quality of care and
convenience.65
B. Economic Incentives for Healthcare Providers to Merge
Economically rational firms merge because the profits generated by the merged firm will surpass the acquisition costs
expended by the merging parties.66 For healthcare providers, a
merged firm lowers its costs and increases its profits by achieving “clinical integration.”67 Clinical integration is the coordination of healthcare services across patients and facilities to
maximize the quality and value of those services.68 From an
antitrust perspective, regulators take the position that once
clinical integration has been achieved by a provider merger, the
merged entity can negotiate jointly with payors without engaging in an agreement in restraint of competition.69 Following the
passage of the ACA, achieving clinical integration is especially
profitable due to the financial incentives the Act offers providers for reducing patient readmissions.70
Many experts believe that the main reason for the recent
upswing in healthcare mergers is the ACA passed in 2010.71
Section 3025 of the Act establishes the Readmissions Reduction program, which, by withholding Medicare funding, penalizes healthcare providers who readmit previously discharged
64

See Argue & Shin, supra note 53, at 50.
See id.
66
See Ronald N. Johnson & Allen M. Parkman, Premerger Notification and the
Incentive to Merge and Litigate, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 145, 148–54 (1991).
67
AM. HOSP. ASS’N, CLINICAL INTEGRATION–THE KEY TO REAL REFORM 1 (2010),
http://www.aha.org/research/reports/tw/10feb-clinicinteg.pdf [https://perma
.cc/H7MD-P82C].
68
See STEPHEN M. SHORTELL ET AL., REMAKING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: THE
EVOLUTION OF ORGANIZED DELIVERY SYSTEMS 129 (2d ed. 2000).
69
See Deborah L. Feinstein, Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care: Proscription, Not Prescription 2–5 (June 19, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.ftc
.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/409481/140619_aco_speech
.pdf [https://perma.cc/X559-SB68]).
70
See Kenneth Kizer, Examining Health Care Competition: Trends in Provider Consolidation 82 (Feb. 25, 2015), (transcript available at https://www.ftc
.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/618591/transcript-day2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4VYL-XPA6]) (“[T]he drive to consolidate providers is largely
driven by this need to achieve clinical integration because of the [Affordable Care
Act].”).
71
See id. at 109–11.
65
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patients for continued treatment of prior ailments.72 In order
to avoid readmissions, healthcare providers seek to control the
entire “continuum” of healthcare for their patients, from diagnosis, to treatment, to rehabilitation.73 Controlling the entire
spectrum of services, known as population health management, reduces the possibility that an error by one provider will
result in a readmission for a different provider.74 Furthermore,
population health management allows health systems to minimize the actuarial risk of any one hospital receiving an excessive number of readmissions.75 In order to achieve the goal of
population health management, providers use mergers to improve quality of care, increase capacity, and expand the range
of services they offer.
Clinical integration results in more efficient delivery of
healthcare services by coordinating and consolidating activities
by separate providers.76 A merger allows healthcare providers
to share patient information, leading to faster and more accurate diagnoses.77 Furthermore, a merger may greatly reduce
administrative overhead costs associated with the management of a health system.78 Finally, the merged firm may be
better able to allocate its resources by assigning physicians
and beds to correspond to the needs of its patients.79
72
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3025, Pub. L. No. 111148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 42
U.S.C.).
73
See Laura Wood, Research and Markets, Avoiding the Readmissions Penalty Zone: Population Health Management for High-Risk Populations, BUS. WIRE
(Mar. 7, 2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/201303070
05474/en/Research-Markets-Avoiding-Readmissions-Penalty-Zone-Population
[https://perma.cc/LDC8-X533] (noting the importance of monitoring the “care
continuum,” especially discharge facilities, in order to achieve population health
management).
74
See id.
75
See Kenneth L. Davis, Hospital Mergers Can Lower Costs and Improve
Medical Care, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2014, 7:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/kenneth-l-davis-hospital-mergers-can-lower-costs-and-improve-medicalcare-1410823048 [https://perma.cc/3XAJ-BSXA] (“[W]ithout [population health
management] there is too great a risk that . . . patients who are high utilizers of
medical services[ ] will unbalance the scales.”).
76
See SHORTELL ET AL., supra note 68, at 129.
77
See Kizer, supra note 70, at 83.
78
See id. at 98.
79
For example, in San Francisco, a population health management system
created a “medical respite and sobering center” where victims of alcohol abuse
could be treated at a far lower cost than in a traditional emergency room. Jeffrey
Bendix, Experts See Potential in Population Health Management, but Obstacles
Remain, MED. ECON. (Aug. 11, 2015), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine
.com/medical-economics/news/experts-see-potential-population-health-management-obstacles-remain [https://perma.cc/8QAU-GDXD].
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III
EFFECTS OF CROSS-MARKET HEALTHCARE PROVIDER MERGERS
A. Anticompetitive Effects of Cross-Market Mergers
In the case of a cross-market merger, market concentration
following the merger is unaffected because the merging providers operate in separate geographic markets. Therefore, patients, the consumers of healthcare services, have the same
variety of healthcare provider choices before and after the
cross-market merger. However, empirically, the prices of a
healthcare provider increase 14 to 18% after joining an out-ofmarket health system.80 Despite this increase in price, studies
indicate that the merged firm lowers its average costs by anywhere from 5 to 14%, suggesting that cross-market mergers
reduce consumer surplus.81 Typically, the increase in market
concentration caused by a merger results in higher prices as
the merged firm commands greater market power than the
merging parties held individually before the consummation of
the merger.82 This Part argues that the merged firm is able to
charge higher prices due to increased bargaining power gained
through the common consumer effect, the exploitation of differing demand elasticities for healthcare services, known as the
cross-subsidization of prices effect, and improved negotiation
skill.
1. Common Consumer Effect
Healthcare providers in separate geographic markets that
merge into a single provider system command more leverage in
negotiating for inclusion in a payor’s network because the
value of the merged firm to the payor’s network is greater than
that of the sum of the merging parties.83 If a payor’s network is
thought of as a blanket of coverage, providers that are not part
of the plan may be thought of as holes.84 Payors seek to minimize the number of holes in their plans in order to make them
attractive to employers.85 By merging, healthcare providers in80
See Matthew S. Lewis & Kevin E. Pflum, Hospital Systems and Bargaining
Power: Evidence from Out-of-Market Acquisitions, RAND J. Econ. 22 (forthcoming
2016) (available at https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2015/retrieve.php?pdf
id=537 [https://perma.cc/DH76-B9CL]).
81
Teresa D. Harrison, Do Mergers Really Reduce Costs? Evidence from Hospitals, 49 ECON. INQUIRY 1054, 1055 (2011).
82
See Matthew Weinberg, The Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 433, 445–46 (2007).
83
See Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 4, at 255.
84
See id.
85
See id. at 275.
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crease the size of the hole that would result if they were to drop
out of a payor’s health plan, thereby increasing their bargaining power with the payor.86 Thus, the merger creates an “interhospital linkage” in which a payor’s bargaining position with
respect to the merged firm depends on whether the payor can
contract with a second provider.87 A horizontal merger increases the bargaining strength of the merged firm because it
eliminates other providers with which the payor may contract if
it fails to reach a deal with the first provider.
A cross-market merger may result in interprovider linkage
because large employers consider coverage across a payor’s
entire network when selecting a plan for its employees.88 Large
employers consider the entire extent of the plan because they
draw employees from a wide geographic area. Figure 1, below,
illustrates a situation in which two providers operating in separate geographic markets may increase their bargaining power
over a payor through a cross-market merger.
FIGURE 1: PATIENT DISCHARGE AREAS FOR NORTH SHORE MEDICAL
CENTER AND SOUTH SHORE HOSPITAL89

86

See id.
See id. at 258.
88
See id.
89
Figure 1 was generated using patient origin data from the Massachusetts
Center for Health Information and Analysis.
87
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Figure 1 displays the geographic extent of the patient discharge areas for North Shore Medical Center in Salem, Massachusetts and South Shore Hospital in South Weymouth,
Massachusetts. The two providers are located about thirty
miles apart,90 and Figure 1 shows that the providers’ respective
patient discharge areas do not overlap, indicating that the
providers operate in separate geographic markets. A hypothetical large employer in central Boston, roughly equidistant from
North Shore and South Shore, may employ people from both
the northern and southern suburbs.91 Therefore, the large employer, in order to provide health coverage for all of its employees, would seek a plan that offers both North Shore and South
Shore. If North Shore and South Shore were to merge and leave
a payor’s network, the merged firm would leave a hole in coverage for both the northern and southern suburbs, making the
plan less desirable for the large central employer. This potential hole caused by the merged firm would be more damaging to
a payor’s plan than the potential holes caused by the merging
parties individually.92 Therefore, the merged firm would command greater bargaining leverage over a payor than that which
North Shore and South Shore commanded over the same payor
prior to the merger.
In a situation like the hypothetical North Shore-South
Shore merger where employers and patients value both of the
merging parties, the increase in bargaining power gained by the
merged firm is due to the “common consumer effect.”93 When
healthcare providers in separate geographic areas merge, the
merged firm can raise its price when there is a payor or group
of payors that negotiated with both merging parties and desires
to include both merging parties in its network.94 The closer the
proximity of the merging firms, the more likely there are common consumers and large employers, who value both parties.95

90
Driving Directions from North Shore Medical Center to South Shore Hospital, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com [https://perma.cc/3HPH-CFFG] (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search starting point field for “North Shore
Medical Center, Salem, MA” and search destination field for “South Shore Hospital, South Weymouth, MA”).
91
C.f. Dafny, supra note 6, at 92.
92
See Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 4, at 255–58.
93
See Dafny, supra note 6, at 91.
94
See id. at 92
95
See id.

R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-3\CRN302.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 17

20-MAR-17

CROSS-MARKET MERGERS IN HEALTHCARE

15:33

837

2. Cross-Market Subsidization of Prices Effect
Following a cross-market merger, the merged firm may be
able to increase prices by taking advantage of differing elasticities of demand in the separate geographic markets of the merging parties.96 For example, when a provider in a market with
elastic demand merges with a provider in a separate market
with inelastic demand, the merged firm may raise prices in the
inelastic market to subsidize a predatory price cut in the elastic
market.97 Predatory pricing in the elastic market serves to
drive out the competition and thus increase the concentration
of that market, ultimately resulting in higher prices.98
For cross-market price subsidization to occur, the merging
parties must negotiate for inclusion in the same payor networks prior to the merger.99 The merged firm may take advantage of cross-market price subsidization even if it negotiates
with payors on a system-wide basis; that is, the merged firm
negotiates for a single price to include all of its facilities in the
payor’s system rather than separate prices for each individual
facility within the system.100 For example, if a provider in a
highly elastic market merges with a provider that holds a monopoly in its local market, the merged firm can charge a higher
system-wide price because payors would be unwilling to risk
losing the monopolist provider, even if it would otherwise be
willing to drop the firm in the elastic market from its network.101 In this example, the provider in the elastic market
becomes more valuable to the payor simply through its association with the monopolist.
Unlike the common consumer effect, cross-market subsidization may occur even without employers that value the inclusion of both merging parties in its health plan.102 However,
like the common consumer effect, cross-market subsidization
will only occur when both merging parties negotiate with the
same payor.103 Since payors typically negotiate with providers
to craft networks on a statewide basis, price increases due to
96

See id. at 93.
See id.
98
See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697–98 (1975).
99
See Dafny, supra note 6, at 93.
100
See Argue & Shin, supra note 53, at 52 (examining the leverage a healthcare provider may extract by being the only provider in a certain geographic area).
101
See id.
102
See Dafny, supra note 6, at 92.
103
See id.
97
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cross-market subsidization are only likely to occur when the
merging parties operate in the same state.104
3. Improved Negotiation Skill
A cross-market merger among providers may allow the
merged firm to increase its bargaining leverage through increased negotiating skill. As a result of mergers, healthcare
providers become more skilled at negotiating as the merging
parties share information about their previous negotiations
with payors.105 For example, following a series of cross-market
provider mergers that led to the creation of Tenet Healthcare in
2004, Tenet adopted a “national negotiating template and new
technology to analyze payer-specific profit and loss data, giving
negotiators ammunition during contract talks.”106 Although
the merger did not increase market concentration, Tenet was
nevertheless able to increase prices by using a shared information system to increase bargaining leverage with payors.107
B. Pro-Competitive Effects of Cross-Market Mergers
While empirical evidence shows that prices tend to increase following cross-market mergers between healthcare
providers, such evidence is unavailable until after the merger
has been consummated.108 Therefore, when a merger is reviewed by regulators and the courts prior to consummation,
the merging parties have the opportunity to show reasons why,
despite the concerns of anticompetitive effects described in
subpart III.A, the merger will benefit consumers. This subpart
details two arguments the merging parties may use to dispel
concerns that their cross-market merger will have anticompetitive effects: improvements in quality of care and price efficiencies resulting in reduced costs.
1. Improvements in Quality of Care
Even though regulators may claim that prices are likely to
increase following a cross-market merger due to the anticompetitive effects described in subpart IV.A, the merging parties
may concede that prices will increase but argue that such in104
See Scott D. Litman, Health Care Reform for the Twenty-First Century: The
Need for a Federal and State Partnership, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 871, 872
(1998).
105
See FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1049 (8th Cir. 1999).
106
Mike Colias, Ready to Rumble, 80 HOSPS. & HEALTH NETWORKS 32, 34–36
(2006).
107
See id.
108
See Lewis & Pflum, supra note 80, at 22.
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crease will be offset by a system-wide improvement in quality of
care.109 This defense faces three main challenges when used to
support a cross-market merger: first, since the merging firms
serve different geographic markets, it is difficult to show how
the system will be able to efficiently allocate its resources to
better serve patients; second, even if the merging parties can
set forth a plan for efficient resource allocation, they must find
an empirical measurement to use as a proxy for quality of care;
and finally, the improvements in quality of care must be
merger-specific.110
The main challenge to raising a successful improvement in
care defense to a cross-market merger is the difficulty of proving improvements in quality of care with empirical evidence.
Empirical evidence shows that patient admissions to a merged
firm do not increase following either an in-market or crossmarket acquisition.111 Thus, regardless of whether the provider’s actual quality of care increases following a merger, patients do not perceive any increase in quality of the merged
firm.112 Nevertheless, the merged firm may be able to use an
increase in the “average reserve margin” of its facilities to empirically suggest that the merged firm offers better care than
did the merging parties separately.113 The average reserve
margin is the number of beds a hospital keeps in reserve below
its full capacity.114 Economists frequently use average reserve
margin as a proxy for quality because physicians believe that
hospitals provide better care when they are operating below
their capacity constraints.115
2. Price Efficiencies
The merging parties may also contend that the merger will
lead to economies of scale that will reduce the price of healthcare services and ultimately benefit consumers. One of the
109
See Hammer, supra note 45, at 759 n.85 (noting that by accurately calculating quality adjusted prices, competition over quality “could be conceptually
reduced to a problem of price competition”).
110
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
111
See Lewis & Pflum, supra note 80, at 33–34.
112
Id.
113
Paul L. Joskow, The Effects of Competition and Regulation on Hospital Bed
Supply and the Reservation Quality of the Hospital, 11 BELL J. ECON. 421, 425–26
(1980).
114
See id.
115
See Paul A. Pautler & Michael G. Vita, Hospital Market Structure, Hospital
Competition, and Consumer Welfare: What Can the Evidence Tell Us?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 117, 124 (1994) (“[I]ncreases in the average reserve margin . . . reduce[ ] expected admission delays, and . . . hospitals provide better care
when they are operating well below their capacity constraints.”).
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most commonly cited efficiencies used by merging parties is
that the merger will allow the firm to cut down on administrative and overhead costs.116 However, for such a defense to be
recognized by regulators and courts, the merging parties must
show that the cost reductions arising out of this efficiency will
be passed on to consumers rather than merely being captured
by the merged firm as additional producer surplus.117 Empirical evidence from completed cross-market healthcare provider
mergers shows that while the merged firm does indeed reduce
its costs, the savings are not passed on to consumers.118
Another efficiencies defense commonly used by the merging parties is that the merger will produce economies of scale,
enabling the merged firm to lower its costs. Economies of scale
are found when the per-patient cost of providing care declines
as the number of patients increases.119 Thus, the merging
parties would contend that the merger, by creating a healthcare provider system capable of caring for more patients, will
allow the merged firm to reduce its per-patient costs and ultimately reduce its prices.120 Studies have shown that hospitals
have constant returns to scale once its size reaches 200–400
beds, meaning that any merger producing a firm capable of
treating more than 400 patients will not receive the full benefits
of economies of scale.121
Finally, the merging parties may argue that the merger will
produce economies of scope that will benefit consumers. Economies of scope arise in healthcare mergers when resources are
shared across facilities and used jointly in treating patients,
making it cheaper to offer multiple services together than to
offer those services separately.122 Following a merger, providers may be able to shift physicians between facilities in order to
more efficiently care for patients.123 Empirical evidence sug116
Michael G. Vita et al., Economic Analysis in Health Care Antirust, 7 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 73, 97 (1991).
117
See id. (“[I]f cost reductions will not be passed on to consumers . . . the
[FTC] is likely to challenge an acquisition.”).
118
See Lewis & Pflum, supra note 80, at 21–22.
119
See Vita et al., supra note 116, at 97.
120
See id. at 98.
121
See id.; see also FRONTIER ECON., A STUDY INVESTIGATING THE EXTENT TO WHICH
THERE ARE ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND SCOPE IN HEALTHCARE MARKETS AND HOW THESE
CAN BE MEASURED BY MONITOR 11 (2012) (stating that the optimal size for an acute
hospital is 200-400 beds), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/up
loads/attachment_data/file/303160/Monitor_Economies_of_Scale_and_Scope__FINAL_REPORT_0_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WLJ-2DW4].
122
See Vita et al., supra note 116, at 97.
123
See id. (noting that in the case of physician services, “the cost of producing
multiple outputs jointly is less than the cost of producing them separately”).
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gests that economies of scope may be achievable in certain
healthcare services such as pediatrics and emergency room
care, but overall, an economies of scope argument does not
provide strong support for an acquisition.124
IV
REVISED EVALUATION OF CROSS-MARKET MERGERS
In response to the recent surge in healthcare mergers, both
antitrust regulators and courts should be aware of the potential for anticompetitive price increases arising from cross-market mergers. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines, as they are
currently written and interpreted, provide insufficient guidance
for regulators and courts in evaluating cross-market mergers,
since merger review under the Guidelines is so tightly interwoven with market concentration.125 In reviewing cross-market
mergers, antitrust regulators should seek to identify potential
cross-consumer effects as well as evaluate the risk of crossmarket price subsidization.126 When faced with preliminary
injunction motions in cross-market merger cases, courts
should move away from their heavy reliance on traditional market concentration evaluations.127 Instead, courts should weigh
the potential for anticompetitive price effects, as presented by
the regulators, against the merging parties’ asserted procompetitive effects, taking into account the geographic limitations of
both the anticompetitive effects and the efficiencies.
A. Proposed Analysis of Cross-Market Mergers by
Antitrust Regulators
The most recent iteration of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines offers antitrust regulators some flexibility finding a
merger anticompetitive without defining a relevant market by
noting that “[e]vidence of competitive effects can inform market
definition, just as market definition can be informative regarding competitive effects.”128 Through this language, the Guidelines allow regulators to bypass market definition in cases
where a merger is certain to cause anticompetitive effects.129
While this language potentially aids antitrust regulators in
124
Id. at 100 (“The evidence on economies of scope is mixed and probably
should not be used to indicate strong support for an acquisition.”).
125
See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
126
See supra subpart II.A.
127
See Garza, supra note 38, at 5 and accompanying text.
128
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 7.
129
See id.
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blocking anticompetitive cross-market healthcare provider
mergers, it has two significant limitations. First, the language
does little to prevent anticompetitive mergers before they happen, since the evidence of resulting price increases, on which
the regulators must rely, does not arise until after the merger
has been consummated. Second, the language provides little
guidance to courts that are accustomed to relying upon the
Philadelphia National Bank presumption in granting injunctions to prevent anticompetitive mergers.
Since the Philadelphia National Bank presumption is explicitly based upon the anticompetitive harms of high market
concentration, in order to invoke the presumption, regulators
must define the market in which the merging parties compete
horizontally.130 Defining the market in the case of a crossmarket merger is difficult because, by definition, the merging
firms do not operate in the same geographic market. Therefore,
a cross-market merger, under the current Guidelines, would
not result in an increase in market concentration, even though
it may result in higher prices.131 The FTC has attempted to
address this problem by ignoring the Merger Guidelines’ emphasis on market definition when evaluating certain crossmarket mergers and attempting to focus the court’s attention
solely on the anticompetitive effects.132 However, thus far the
FTC has only taken this approach to challenge mergers retroactively, after the anticompetitive effects have already occurred.133 In order to proactively prevent mergers that will
produce anticompetitive effects, regulators should compile
structural evidence surrounding the deal that indicates the
potential for such anticompetitive effects. Specifically, once a
review of the merging parties’ patient discharge data indicates
that the parties operate in separate geographic markets, the
regulator must identify the potential for common consumer
effects and cross-market subsidization.134
130

See Phila. Nat’l Bank v. United States, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
See Lewis & Pflum, supra note 80, at 22.
132
See in re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., F.T.C. No. 9315, at 87 (2008) (“[I]t
is appropriate to prove anticompetitive effects through direct evidence in place of
market definition.”).
133
See Schencker, supra note 9 (quoting antitrust expert Jeff Miles claiming
“[t]he FTC has not brought a cross-market merger case, but there’s a good deal
of . . . economic research going on looking into a theory under which they can be
challenged”).
134
If the patient discharge data indicates that the parties operate within the
same geographic market, traditional Horizontal Merger Analysis under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines should apply. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra
131
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First, to identify the potential for anticompetitive common
consumer effects arising from a cross-market merger, regulators must closely analyze the geographic relationship between
the merging parties. To begin, regulators should identify
whether the merging parties operate any facilities within the
same state and examine whether the parties negotiate with any
of the same payors.135 The locations of the parties’ facilities
likely will be available publicly on the parties’ websites or, if the
merger involves a large enough value, in the parties’ premerger
notification filing.136 The regulators must then contact payors
who offer plans in the regions the merging parties operate to
determine if the parties negotiate with any of the same
payors.137 If the parties operate facilities in the same state and
negotiate with any of the same payors, anticompetitive common consumer effects are possible.
Next, regulators must obtain additional evidence from
payors and employers to determine whether common consumer effects are likely enough to warrant blocking the merger.
The regulator must examine more carefully the parties’ patient
discharge information to gauge the possibility that an employer
operating within or in between the separate geographic markets of the merging parties might value the inclusion for both
parties in its health plan for the benefit of its employees.138 For
example, in the hypothetical North Shore-South Shore merger,
where the merging parties’ facilities are a mere thirty miles
apart and between them lays central Boston, it is likely that an
employer would have workers who live in both the northern
and southern suburbs. This hypothetical central Boston employer would want access to both of the merging providers in its
health plan. Using patient discharge data, regulators can determine the distance patients are willing to travel for care at a
given healthcare facility.139 Figure 2, below, details how, by
note 7, at 13–14 (describing how to define a geographic market based on the
location of customers).
135
In general, payors must operate facilities in the same state in order to
negotiate with the same payors. See Colias, supra note 106, at 33.
136
Addresses at which the parties conduct business must be included in the
parties’ premerger notification form. Antitrust Improvements Act Notification and
Report Form for Certain Mergers and Acquisitions, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/form-instructions/instructions_-_final_05-13-14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6GWU-U84E].
137
See supra section II.A.1.
138
See Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 4, at 255–57 and accompanying text.
139
See, e.g., Fig. 1; supra note 89. The distance patients are willing to travel is
represented by the edge of the patient discharge area for North Shore and South
Shore.
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using this information on patients’ willingness to travel for
healthcare and the typical commute distance for the area in
which the merging parties operate, regulators may determine,
as a threshold matter, whether any common consumers are
likely to exist.140
FIGURE 2: EXAMINING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A COMMON CONSUMER
C = Typical Commute Distance
Pa
a = Distance patients are willing to travel to Provider A’s
facility
Pb
b = Distance patients are willing to travel to Provider B’s
facility
D = Distance between Provider A and Provider B

C
Provider A

Pa

Provider B

Pb
D

Common Consumer is likely when:

C

≥

D – (Pa+Pb)
a
b
2

In Figure 2, Pa and Pb represent the radius of the patient
discharge areas for Provider A and Provider B’s facilities respectively. Thus, if the distance between Pa and Pb is less than
2*C, the diameter of the circle representing the typical commute distance for the metropolitan area in which Provider A
and Provider B operate, an employer could draw a typical commuter from both Provider A and Provider B’s patient discharge
area. Therefore, as a threshold matter, under these conditions,
a common consumer is likely to exist.
140
ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & NATALIE HOLMES, BROOKINGS, THE GROWING DISTANCE
BETWEEN PEOPLE AND JOBS IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 3 (2015).
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If, as a threshold matter, common consumers of the two
merging parties are likely, then regulators should proceed by
contacting large employers in the area of concern to determine
if employers in the area value including both providers in its
health plan.141 If both providers are valued by local employers,
the regulators should next interview payors to evaluate the
bargaining power of the merging parties and the prospective
power of the merged firm. Specifically, the regulators would
need to determine if payors would be willing to drop the merged
firm from its network if the firm threatened a SSNIP.142 When
obtaining evidence from payors, regulators must be mindful of
the risk that payors will fabricate claims in order to shift bargaining power over providers in their favor.143 Despite the fact
that the merging parties operate in separate geographic markets, if the regulators determine that employers desire both
parties in their health plans and payors would be unable to
resist a SSNIP from the merged firm, then the common consumer effect is likely to cause an increase in prices following
the merger and the regulator may choose to block the merger.
Next, the regulators must evaluate the potential for anticompetitive effects arising from cross-market subsidization of
prices. Like the common consumer effect, for cross-market
subsidization to occur, there must exist payors that negotiate
with both parties.144 If such common payors exist, regulators
must examine the elasticity of demand for healthcare in the
separate geographic markets of the merging parties.145 Elasticity of demand is the absolute value of the ratio of the percent
change in quantity demanded for a product to the percent
change in price of that product.146 An elasticity value less than
one indicates that the market is inelastic while a value greater
than one indicates that the market is elastic.147 In an inelastic
market, consumer demand is not heavily dependent on price
while in an elastic market, consumers are highly sensitive to
141

See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 9–10.
143
Providers and payors are engaged in an ongoing battle over bargaining
power in negotiations. See McCarthy & Thomas, supra note 59, at 2–5.
144
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
145
Cross-market subsidization of prices occurs when the merged firm exploits
differences in elasticity between the separate geographic markets of the merging
parties. See Dafny, supra note 6, at 89–90 and accompanying text.
146
JEANNE S. RINGEL ET AL., RAND, THE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE: A
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM 9
(2002).
147
Furthermore, a value of zero indicates that the market is perfectly inelastic
while an infinite value indicates the market is perfectly elastic. See id. at 10.
142
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price when making their purchasing decisions.148 Therefore,
in the context of healthcare providers, a provider in an inelastic
market will lose fewer consumers following a price increase
than a provider in an elastic market.
Calculating elasticity for healthcare services markets
presents a unique challenge because the consumers who respond to price are payors rather than the patients who ultimately consume the services.149 From a payor’s perspective,
the value of including a provider in its plan increases as the
number of possible substitute providers in that market decreases.150 Market concentration serves as a good proxy for
market elasticity since a payor would be less sensitive to an
increase in price in a market with many substitute providers.151 A highly concentrated market is likely to be inelastic
while an unconcentrated market is likely to be elastic.152
Thus, in evaluating the elasticity of demand for a particular
healthcare market, regulators should begin by calculating market concentration for the market.153
Next, regulators should consider whether there is a significant difference in market concentration between the separate
geographic markets of the merging parties, where one market
is highly concentrated while the other is unconcentrated.154 A
significant difference in market concentration suggests a parallel difference in elasticity between the markets.155 The merged
firm could potentially exploit this difference in elasticity by
raising prices in the inelastic market to subsidize predatory
prices in the elastic market.156 If such conditions are present,
regulators should inquire as to whether payors would be willing to lose the merged firm from its network if the merged firm

148

See id.
See Argue & Shin, supra note 53, at 50.
150
See Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 4, at 266–67.
151
See id.
152
See supra section II.A.2.
153
To calculate the market share for a given provider, take the number of beds
operated by that provider divided by the total number of beds in the market. See
supra note 30 and accompanying text. Use the market shares for firms in the
market to calculate the HHI market concentration. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
154
An unconcentrated market has an HHI below 1500 while a highly concentrated market has an HHI above 2500. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note
7, at 18; see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
155
See Dafny, supra note 6, at 93.
156
See id.
149
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threatened a SSNIP.157 If the payors will negotiate with the
merged firm on a system-wide rather than a facility-by-facility
basis, regulators should ask the payors whether they would be
willing to pay the merged firm a higher price to keep coverage in
the inelastic market.158 Ultimately, if the merged firm would
gain negotiating leverage because of its presence in the highly
concentrated, inelastic market, the merger may result in significant anticompetitive effects due to cross-market price
subsidization.
B. Proposed Analysis of Cross-Market Mergers by Courts
Under the current approach to granting preliminary injunctions in hospital merger cases, courts place great weight
on market concentration.159 However, market concentration
may not paint a complete picture of the anticompetitive effects
that may arise from cross-market mergers. As the economic
analysis of cross-market mergers continues to improve, courts
will give more weight to the antitrust regulators’ arguments on
potential anticompetitive effects. The amount of weight courts
should give to the potential anticompetitive effects ultimately
depends on the extent to which the conditions surrounding the
merger suggest the potential for harm to consumers.160 This
section assumes that the evidence presented by the regulators
is sufficient to establish a prima facie case that the merger will
result in anticompetitive effects. In response, the merging parties may offer an improvement in care or a price efficiencies
defense to argue that the merger is not in fact anticompetitive.
This subpart examines how courts should evaluate these defenses in light of the goals of the ACA, the true motives behind
the merger, and the unique aspects of cross-market mergers
that present challenges to achieving efficiencies.
Courts should be wary of improvement in care defenses
where the primary motivation behind the merger was to reduce
costs or increase the bargaining power of the merged firm. The
merging parties may allege that an increase in price following
the merger does not reduce consumer surplus because it is
offset by an improvement in quality. Courts should give great
157
The merged provider can exploit the payor’s need to offer coverage in the
inelastic market by charging a higher price for this market individually or for its
system as a whole. See id.
158
See id.
159
See Garza, supra note 38, at 4.
160
The court must evaluate whether the conditions surrounding the merger
are such so as to give rise to the common consumer effect or cross-market price
subsidization. See section III.C.1.
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weight to this defense since the ACA expresses Congress’ intent
to encourage healthcare providers to improve quality of care.161
The merging parties may use average reserve margin as a proxy
for quality to argue that the merger improves quality of care by
increasing the level of resources available per patient.162 The
merging parties may also claim that the merger will improve
system-wide access to physicians.163 However, regulators and
courts may be able to undermine the improvement in quality of
care defense if correspondence between the merging parties
indicates that a primary motivation behind the merger is to
reduce costs or eliminate competition. Courts should be skeptical of alleged improvements in quality where the primary motivation of the merger is cost reduction, since effective clinical
integration is typically not found where a merger was initiated
to reduce costs or increase bargaining power with payors.164
The merging parties could also contend that the merger
will produce price efficiencies that would enable the merged
firm to lower costs and pass the savings on to consumers. This
efficiencies defense contends that increasing the scale of production would allow the firm to allocate resources more efficiently, reducing the length of patient stays without
compromising quality.165 Generally, however, to take advantage of economies of scale, the healthcare facilities in the
merged firm must be able to effectively coordinate their operations.166 Thus, courts should discount this defense when the
distance between the merging parties makes it unlikely that
the merged firm will be able to effectively coordinate its operations to improve care. Because patients are so concerned with
convenience when selecting healthcare providers, in some
161
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3025, supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
162
See Pautler & Vita, supra note 115, at 124.
163
Scott Baltic, Monopolizing Medicine: Why Hospitals’ Quest to Control
Healthcare Costs is a Losing Game, 91 MED. ECON., Feb. 25, 2014, at 20, 27
(“[C]onsolidation . . . undertaken ‘primarily for the purpose of enhanced bargaining power with payers’ . . . did not lead to true integration nor to enhanced
performance.” (quoting Martin Gaynor & Robert Town, The Impact of Hospital
Consolidation-Update, SYNTHESIS PROJECT (2012))).
164
See id.
165
See Aileen Clarke, Why Are We Trying to Reduce Length of Stay? Evaluation of the Costs and Benefits of Reducing Time in Hospital Must Start from the
Objectives that Govern the Change, 5 QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE 172 (1996)
(“[R]eductions of time spent in hospital will reduce costs without compromising
patient outcomes.”).
166
See Davis, supra note 5 (“Population health management means services
must be coordinated . . . . This requires hospital systems to provide a full suite of
services for their patient populations, warranting expansion through acquisitions
of other hospitals . . . .”).
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cases they will be unwilling to travel to a distant facility, even if
it is better suited for treating that patient than a nearby facility.167 One estimate suggests that patients are willing to travel
a maximum of seventy-five miles for healthcare.168 This means
that the ability of the merged firm to direct patients to the most
efficient and highest quality treatment option is limited by the
distance patients are willing to travel for healthcare.169 Since
the merging parties to a cross-market merger operate in separate geographic markets, any plan to improve quality of care
would only be viable if the parties can show that patients would
be willing to travel the distance between the separate geographic markets in order to receive healthcare.170
CONCLUSION
Cross-market mergers between healthcare providers, until
recently viewed as harmless by antitrust regulators and courts,
may have anticompetitive effects that harm American consumers. The potential for anticompetitive effects from cross-market
healthcare provider mergers is greatly enhanced by the fact
that healthcare mergers are occurring more frequently now
more than ever and being driven by the incentives of the
ACA.171 Regulators have already shown a willingness to address this problem, but with relatively few sources of economic
proof indicating price effects following cross-market mergers,
the FTC and the DOJ are left with little ammunition to block a
potentially anticompetitive cross-market merger in court. As
economic analysis of cross-market mergers improves, regula167
See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Patients’ willingness to travel
for healthcare varies across different regions of the country. For example, data
from the Washington State Office of Financial Management show that an average
adult is willing to travel 20.4 miles for routine care and twenty-two miles for
urgent care. WEI YEN, WASH. STATE OFF. OF FIN. MGMT., HOW LONG AND HOW FAR DO
ADULTS TRAVEL AND WILL ADULTS TRAVEL FOR PRIMARY CARE? (2013), http://www
.ofm.wa.gov/researchbriefs/2013/brief070.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6L2-J3DF].
168
See Lewis & Pflum, supra note 80, at 22.
169
Based on the Lewis-Pflum estimate, a patient living at the midpoint between the merging parties’ facilities would be willing to travel seventy-five miles in
either direction for care, meaning that the facilities must be a maximum of 150
miles apart in order to result in an improvement in quality of care. See id.
170
For example, consider the hypothetical merger between North Shore and
South Shore discussed in section II.A.1. Although North Shore and South Shore
do not currently attract the same patients, the parties, by taking a survey from
their current patients, may be able to show that their patients would be willing to
travel thirty miles further to use the other facility, especially to receive specialized
care.
171
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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tors will be able to predict more accurately the conditions that
cause cross-market mergers to increase prices.
By and large, price increases following cross-market mergers are due to the increase in bargaining power the merged firm
gains over health insurance payors with whom the merging
parties negotiated prior to the merger. Increased bargaining
power following a cross-market merger may result from either
the common consumer effect or cross-subsidization of prices.
This Note sets forth tactics regulators may employ to identify
conditions that lead to these effects so that regulators may
block anticompetitive cross-market healthcare provider mergers before they are consummated. To assist in identifying the
potential for the common consumer effect, this Note offers a
threshold analysis whereby regulators may use both consumers’ willingness to commute in an area and consumers’ willingness to travel for healthcare to suggest the potential for a
common consumer between two merging parties. In the future,
regulators may improve upon this threshold analysis by accounting for population distribution in the area between the
providers as well as workers that commute further than the
typical commute distance for the relevant area. Furthermore,
with more information on the actual economic effects of crossmarket mergers, regression analysis might be used to identify a
causal relationship between the existence of common consumers or a differential in market elasticity between the merging
firms and increases in price for healthcare following a
merger.172
This Note advocates taking a more open approach to the
traditional balancing of anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of mergers. Courts must consider both arguments from
the regulators suggesting conditions surrounding the merger
that indicate the potential for price increases and arguments
from the merging parties that the merger will in fact result in
higher quality care or efficiencies leading to lower prices. Advising courts on a general course of action is difficult because
there is a broad range of ways in which modern courts analyze
efficiencies defenses.173 Furthermore, courts must not place
too much weight on potential anticompetitive effects so as to
prevent or deter beneficial mergers that further Congress’ in172
See Alan O. Sykes, An Introduction to Regression Analysis 3 (Univ. of Chi.
Law Sch., Law & Econs., Paper No. 20, 1992), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
files/files/20.Sykes_.Regression_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/V79G-6ZGX] (explaining how regression analysis may be used to test hypotheses “about the relationship between the variables of interest”).
173
See supra section II.A.3.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-3\CRN302.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 31

20-MAR-17

CROSS-MARKET MERGERS IN HEALTHCARE

15:33

851

tent of improving care embodied in the ACA.174 This Note provides guidance on when courts should discount the merging
parties’ improvements in quality and price efficiencies defenses
in light of the likelihood of anticompetitive effects.

174

See supra note 70–71 and accompanying text.
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